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A principal operational concept of Joint Vision 2020 is that of Focused Logistics, 
which promotes a merger of information and logistics technologies. The Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency's Advanced Logistics Project (ALP) supports this 
concept of Focused Logistics and seeks to leverage information technologies to obtain 
control over the logistics pipeline. 
The current campaign planning process is limited by the information made 
available to the decision-makers. In order for ALP to assist the decision-maker in 
selecting a single optimal deployment plan, the founding assumptions of alternatives 
considered must be valid. Logistical issues are a major constraint in the war planning 
process. Often, when planners are faced with Crisis Action Planning (CAP) the 
interaction between the operations planners and the logistics planners is limited due to the 
time sensitivity of the situation. Because logistics information is a main constraint in the 
CAP process, operational planners build their plans based on limited logistics information 
and potentially inappropriate logistic assumptions. 
This thesis will explore the contribution that ALP's architecture could bring to the 
crisis action planning process. The focus of this research is to analyze the interaction 
between the operational and logistical communities and determine the ideal planning tool 
that will enhance the communication between the two communities. 
IX 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE J3 AND J4 WAR 
PLANNING STAFFS DURING THE PHASES OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING 
I. Introduction 
Background 
A principal operational concept of Joint Vision 2020 is that of Focused Logistics, 
which promotes a merger of information and logistics technologies to enable a more 
mobile, versatile, and easily deployable joint force. The Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency's (DARPA) Advanced Logistics Project (ALP) supports this concept of 
Focused Logistics and seeks to leverage information technologies to obtain control over 
the logistics pipeline (Carrico: 1999). DARPA's development of an automated, multi- 
echelon, real-time cooperative information technology is intended to provide the 
logisticians and warfighters with an unprecedented capability to plan, execute, monitor, 
and rapidly rebuild campaign plans, as the campaign proceeds (Carrico: 1999). The Air 
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) are 
working together to develop a methodology for ALP that measures the relative value of 
each combat force mix alternative in relation to the logistics tail. 
This thesis will identify the potential contribution that the ALP architecture could 
bring to the crisis action planning process. The aim of this research is to define the ideal 
decision support tool for the campaign planner, and determine how ALP could help 
improve the existing process. 
Problem Statement 
The current campaign planning process is limited by the information made 
available to the decision-makers. In order for the Advanced Logistics Project to assist the 
decision-maker in selecting a single optimal deployment plan, the founding assumptions 
of alternatives considered must be valid. Logistical issues are a major constraint in the 
war planning process. Often, when planners are faced with Crisis Action Planning (CAP) 
the interaction between the operations planners and the logistics planners is limited due to 
the time sensitivity of the situation. Because logistics information is a main constraint in 
the CAP process, operational planners build their plans based on limited logistics 
information and potentially inappropriate logistic assumptions. The focus of this research 
is to assess the interaction between the operational and logistical communities and 
determine the value and characteristics of the ideal tool, enhancing the communication 
between the two communities. First we must describe a key term that will be used 
throughout this paper. 
Knowledge Management 
"Knowledge management involves the identification and analysis of available and 
required knowledge assets and knowledge asset related processes, and the subsequent 
planning and control of actions to develop both the assets and the processes so as to fulfill 
organizational objectives" (Macintosh: 1999). One approach to assess the interaction 
between the operational and logistical communities is to capture the knowledge that 
exists in the campaign planning process. Knowledge can be used as a tool to help 
leverage the capacity that exists in an organization. Knowledge can be regarded as an 
asset that organizations possess or need to enhance operations. Knowledge management 
not only manages these assets, but the processes that act upon them. Processes that act 
upon knowledge assets include: developing knowledge; preserving knowledge; using 
knowledge; and sharing knowledge (Macintosh: 1999). 
The difficulty in knowledge management arises with identifying the knowledge 
assets of an organization. The initial step in managing the knowledge assets in an 
organization or process is to first identify and categorize the knowledge. Once the 
organization's knowledge assets are identified and categorized, then knowledge 
management can begin. The war planning process involves the synthesis of knowledge 
from several different functional disciplines. The war planner possesses knowledge from 
doctrine and training. The war planner also possesses knowledge from past experiences. 
Functional knowledge from several other disciplines mix into the war planning process. 
The ALP architecture enables access to these areas of functional knowledge on a real- 
time basis. 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this research effort is defined by the overall research question: 
what knowledge must be shared between the operational planner (J3) and the logistics 
planner (J4) to optimally execute the crisis action planning process? To successfully 
complete this research project, the following investigative questions must be answered: 
1. What is the process involved with the operational order (OPORD) 
generation? 
2. What deployment planning, campaign planning, and operational 
order generation tools are used today? 
3. What is the available knowledge in the CAP process? 
4. What is the required knowledge in the CAP process? 
5. To what extent does the value of ALP contribute to the CAP 
process, and where do the existing tools fall short? 
Methodology 
The methodology used in this research was conducted in three phases; knowledge 
identification, knowledge audit, and comparative analysis. The first phase of the research 
consisted of both archival review and content analysis (literature review), and in-person 
interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) on the war planning process. The second 
phase involved email questionnaires to seek specific knowledge from joint air component 
planner's perspectives. This phase engaged a knowledge audit to capture the knowledge 
held by the war planner, the knowledge needed by the war planner, and the knowledge 
made available by the ALP architecture. The final phase compared the knowledge assets 
of the current CAP process with the knowledge assets that ALP can provide. This 
comparison was achieved by a knowledge analysis method called knowledge mapping. 
Assumptions 
This research is based on current Air Force doctrine and policies. Many of the 
concepts that ALP is developing are not constrained by the notional war planning ideas 
currently employed. The SME's validations of the weighted values assigned to aircraft to 
mission taskings are based on current strategical and tactical philosophies. The following 
numbered Air Forces, major commands, and school houses took part in this study: Joint 
Staff J3, Checkmate Air Force Headquarters, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), 
European Command (EUCOM), 12th Air Force Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 9th 
Air Force Central Command (CENTCOM), Air Component Command (ACC), Special 
Operations Command (AFSOC), Air Expeditionary Force Center, Air Warfare Center 
USAF Weapons School, College of Aerospace Doctrine Research, and Education 
(CADRE), and the Air Force Command and Control Training and Innovation Group 
(AFC2TIG). 
Scope/Limitations 
While this research focused on the USAF perspective of war planning, a multi- 
national approach to war planning will need to be supported in future combat operations. 
The United States support of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) involves 
USAF war planners coordinating with coalition forces to accomplish global objectives. 
Besides the interaction between coalition forces and USAF planners, the Air Force must 
consider the joint role of campaign planning interaction. Campaigns involve alternatives 
of actions that include any combination of service mixes. Planning in the joint 
environment is a major issue in cluster-based objective in ALPs architecture (Carrico: 
1999). The results of this research can be used by the war planner as a dynamic decision 
support tool. 
Summary 
This chapter provided the background of defining, validating, and examining 
campaign specific decision support tools that assist the war planners in selecting the best 
mix of combat aircraft to accomplish the desired mission objectives. 
Chapter II reviews Air Force doctrine, decision support tools currently employed, 
and the methodology used to elicit information from the SMEs. Chapter III describes in 
detail the methodology introduced in Chapter II and is used to accomplish a knowledge 
audit. Chapter IV displays the results of the knowledge audit and relational analysis. 
Chapter V provides conclusions and discusses what the ideal tool in the crisis action 
planning process would be. 
II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
The air campaign planner's main objective is to provide the Commander-in-Chief 
(CINC) with a satisfactory set of combat aircraft that meet the required mission. ALPs   ' 
goal is to converge operations and logistics information systems as an operational plan is 
executed. As Joint Publication 1 states, "logistics sets the campaign's operational limits." 
Without the proper linkage between the operations (J3) and logistics (J4) planners, the set 
of combat forces provided to the CINC results in less than optimal solutions. To expand 
the operational limits of a campaign, a collaborative effort must exist between the 
operations and logistics planners to ensure that the optimal alternative is provided to the 
CINC to meet the desired requirements. 
Background of Problem 
There is apprehension that the US defense planning process has difficulty in 
translating national-level policy guidance into feasible defense contingency plans, which, 
if implemented, create winning outcomes. These concerns are addressed in Carlson, 
Sierra, and King's paper, Strategy, Policy and Contingency Planning: The US Defense 
Planning Process (Carlson, et al: 1984). Some of these concerns center on planning 
outcomes such as: the aborted mission to rescue the American hostages in Iran; the 1975 
Mayaguez rescue operation; the 1970 North Vietnam Sontay prison raid to free US 
prisoners of war; the Beirut terrorist bombing where 241 servicemen were killed; and 
even the successful 1983 Grenada invasion (hailed as a success, yet faulted for major 
command and intelligence lapses) (Carlson, et al: 1984). Their study analyzed the 
current defense planning process, its current day viability, and its relationship with 
National Command Authority guidance. The authors interviewed key planning officials 
throughout the Departments of Defense and State and the National Security Council. 
Their study concluded that the US defense planning process is functioning; but not as 
specifically intended, and is in need of corrective action and direction, especially in the 
area of crisis contingency planning (Carlson et al: 1984). 
The results of their study (in part) led to the Goldwater-Nichols DoD 
Reorganization Act of 1986. The act sought to improve joint operations and provided 
complete authority of the CINC over the subordinate forces within his command 
(Osgood: 1996). The act shifted the lines of authority for military forces within an 
unified command from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the CINC. Clear lines of 
authority lead to unification of the war planning effort. Osgood discusses how General 
Schwarzkopf had real command over his unified command during the war in the gulf for 
the first time in a major confrontation (Osgood: 1996). Unification in the war planning 
environment diminishes fragmented, uncoordinated strategy. The Goldwater-Nichols Act 
legally mandates jointness by statute (Osgood: 1996). Osgood emphasizes the need for 
unified command when he refers to General Eisenhower's slogan, "singly led and 
prepared to fight as one regardless of service" (Osgood: 1996). Similarly, unification of 
the crisis action planning process between the J3 and J4 will result in more successful 
execution. While the Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed joint operations and command 
and control, problems in the campaign planning process still exist. 
The war planning process is categorized in two basic processes under campaign 
planning: deliberate planning and crisis action planning (Joint Pub: 5-0). Figure 1 
shows the interrelated processes. 
JOINT OPERATION PLANNING 
Figure 1: Joint Planning Process 
Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning 
processes. Campaign planning begins with deliberate planning under peacetime 
operations and continues with crisis action planning as required. Deliberate planning 
involves the development of Operational Plans (OPLANs), usually during peacetime 
operations. Deliberate plans are accomplished in two-year cycles in accordance with the 
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (Joint Pub 5-03.1: 1995). The parameters of the 
JSCP process revolve around the annual defense budget and the current threats to 
national security at the present time. Due to the natural collaborative effort of deliberate 
planning, this research will focus on the interaction between the J3 and J4 planners 
during the more time sensitive process of crisis action planning. Crisis Action Planning 
is a set of procedures that provide guidance and procedures for joint operation planning 
by military forces during emergency or time sensitive situations (JOPES Vol I). 
Defense policy defines the CAP process in Joint Publication 5-00.2. While 
deliberate planning is accomplished to anticipate future events, CAP was designed to 
respond to present situations that arise at a moments notice. Occasionally, the situation 
may be similar to those situations planned for in the deliberate planning process; 
however, it is not likely that it will be identical. A comparison of the two planning 
processes can be seen in Figure 2 (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). 






























REAL-TIME PROCESS (Hours & Days) 
CRISIS ACTION PLANNING 
Figure 2: Joint Planning Summary 
Deliberate planning begins with the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP). The 
JSCP apportions forces and resources based on political and military assumptions that 
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exist when the plans are implemented. JSCP is the primary vehicle used by the Chairman 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to exercise his responsibility in providing for joint 
operational plans (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). This process involves the participation of the 
entire Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The deliberate planning process 
concludes with the development of operational plans. 
The CAP process begins when a certain event or incident occurs and ends when 
the crisis is resolved or forces are withdrawn. The CINC reports the situation as it 
develops to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the JCS. Depending on the 
time sensitivity of the situation, a Course of Action (CO A) could be submitted along with 
the notification. After the event is reported, the NCA and JCS analyze the situation 
determining if a military option is required. The NCA demonstrates great flexibility in 
this phase of CAP. It has the options to wait for further information, progress to the next 
phase, or revert back to the pre-crisis posture (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). If the NCA 
decides to progress to the next phase of CAP, it provides the strategic guidance for the 
joint operation planning and possible guidance for the COAs to be developed. It is at this 
point when a Joint Task Force (JTF) may be established, if one does not already exist 
(Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). 
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The majority of the planning process for CAP occurs during COA Development, 
COA Selection, and Execution Planning phases. It is for this reason that the author 
selected these phases of CAP for this research. An overview of these three phases is 
depicted in the Figure 3. 
Phase III:     \ 
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Flow Direction 
Figure 3: CAP Phases III-V 
Current Crisis Action Planning Process as Defined by Defense Policy 
Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine, establishes the framework for 
understanding how to apply military power. This manual applies equally to active 
military, reserve components, and civilians. Through the study of war, doctrine is 
derived (AFM 1-1: 1992). It offers guidance to Air Force leaders to learn from the past, 
to act in the present, and to influence the future. This doctrine lays the foundation for all 
Air Force policies that organize, train, equip, and sustain aerospace forces for war (AFM 
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1 -1: 1992). It also describes the nature of combat support and its relationship to 
aerospace power. 
Joint Publication 5-0 goes into further detail concerning the joint war planning 
environment. The JPEC consists of the CJCS, as well as other members of the JCS, the 
combatant commands and their command components, subunified commands, joint task 
forces, and Defense agencies (Joint Pub 5-0: 1995). JPEC's involvement in the planning 
process includes the mobilization, training, preparation, movement, reception, 
employment, and support of forces committed to a specific theater of war (Joint Pub 5-0: 
1995). Figure 4, taken from Joint Pub 5.0, outlines the JPEC population. 
The Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) 
THE PRESIDENT AND SEC0EF {NCA} 
THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) 
THE JOINT PLANNING AND 
EXECUTION COMMUNITY (JPEC) 
Figure 4: The Joint Planning and Execution Community 
Depending on the time sensitivity of the crisis situation, the roles of the JPEC 
community vary. The CAP process is dynamic, with the body of knowledge evolving 
from minute to minute. Due to this dynamic process, this research seeks to capture this 
decision making process under three templates: as it is written, as it is actually 
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experienced, and how it could be improved with the application of ALP added to the 
process. 
The JPEC uses the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to 
conduct joint planning during peacetime and contingencies. The focus of the joint 
operational planning process is at the combat commanders level using JOPES to 
coordinate the best method of accomplishing the desired mission. This coordination 
includes the NCA, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and all other support agencies 
in the JPEC. During peacetime operations this planning process, called deliberate 
planning, produces operation plans (OPLANs). In times of crisis, this planning process 
(CAP) produces operation orders (OPORDs). JOPES is designed to facilitate both the 
generation of OP LANs in deliberate planning and the rapid development of OPORDs 
built from existing OPLANs or NO-PLAN scenarios in CAP (Joint Pub: 5-0). 
During crisis action planning, information is passed from the JCS to the NCA 
concerning decisions involving the use of US military forces. JOPES Vol. I defines a 
crisis as 
... an incident or situation involving a threat to the US, its territories, 
citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops 
rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or 
military importance to the US government that commitment of US 
military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve US national 
objectives (JOPES Vol. I). 
CAP consists of the following six phases: 
• situation Development 
• crisis assessment 
• course of action Development 
14 
• course of action selection 
• Execution Planning 
• execution 
Phase I of the crisis action planning process, situation Development, involves the 
supported command reporting a significant event to the National Military Command 
Center (NMCC). This report includes the CINC's assessment of the event, describing the 
nature of the crisis, forces available, major constraints, actions being taken, and courses 
of action being considered. This report is channeled through the CJCS, who evaluates the 
reports and the actions of the CINC, to the NCA. 
Phase II involves crisis assessment. The NCA decides to develop the military 
course of action (COA). The CINC continues to report the status of the situation while 
reviewing existing OPLANs for applicability. The CINC can use an existing OPLAN, 
use it as a building block, or build a plan from the ground up. The CJCS gives the 
CINC's assessment to the NCA and continues to monitor and review the CINC's plans 
and actions. 
The Joint Task Force (JTF) should be established prior to Phase III of the CAP 
process to allow maximum participation in as much of the process as possible. Once the 
JTF is established, a planning element should be formed to optimize the process. This 
planning element is commonly referred to as a Joint Planning Group (JPG). 
The composition of the JPG varies depending upon the nature of the crisis and 
which command was involved. Generally, the JPG consists of representatives from the 
following functions: Jl (personnel), J2 (intelligence), J3 (operations), J4 (logistics), J5 
(plans), J6 (communications), medical, staff judge advocate, and public affairs. Joint Pub 
15 
5-00.2 states that JPG representation should be long-term assignments to provide 
continuity and a small group of core planners with the authority to speak on behalf of 
their sections, components, or organizations (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). 
Phase III course of action Development begins when the NCA decides that 
military options are required to resolve the crisis. The directive, handed down by the 
NCA, establishes command relationships, identifies the mission, and provides any 
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Figure 5: CAP Phase III COA Development 
CO As can be developed from existing OPLANs, modified OPLANs, from the 
ground up, or as directed by the NCA. In the event that the NCA directs the development 
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of a specific COA, the directive will describe the COA and request the supported 
commanders assessment (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). During this phase of CAP, the JCS 
publishes the Warning Order. The Warning Order gives initial guidance to the JPEC and 
requests that the CINC develops a recommended COA to meet the situation. Based on 
the CINCs guidance, Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) development 
begins. TPFDDs are developed for each COA, time permitting. Supporting agencies 
review proposed CO As for feasibility and advance planning possibilities. Phase III ends 
after the supported CINC commander analyzes and submits the selected COA to the 
NCA and JCS. 
Phase IV, COA Selection, begins when the NCA authorizes and selects the COA 
submitted by the CINC (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). After the NCA decision, the CJCS 
issues an Alert Order. The Alert Order is approved by the Secretary of Defense and 
issued to the CINC and the rest of JPEC announcing the selected COA and directing the 
initiation of Execution Planning. The CJCS can issue a Planning Order to initiate 
Execution Planning prior to the selection of a COA by the NCA. Once the NCA selects a 
COA, the Secretary of Defense must approve the Planning Order. The CINC issues the 
directive to the Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF) to commence detailed 
Execution Planning. As the directives are passed down to the JTF components, they 
become more specific to each of the appropriate components. Phase TV of the CAP 
process is displayed in Figure 6. 
17 
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Figure 6: CAP Phase IV COA Selection 
Phase V, Execution Planning, begins once the Planning or Alert Order is issued. 
The CINC transforms the approved COA into an Operational Order (OPORD). The 
CJTF develops an OPORD based on the CINCs OPORD. JOPES procedures are used in 
the development of the OPORD and the TPFDD (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). The CJTF 
inputs unsourced force requirements into the appropriate TPFDD and validates the 
requirements through the supported CINC. JOPES and the other feeder systems that 
provide the planners with the required information are vital in this phase of planning. 
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The supported CINC validates the TPFDD to the Commander in Chief, United States 
Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). Any changes to 
the TPFDD must be revalidated through the supported CINC and USCINCTRANS. The 
Execution Planning phase concludes when the NCA implements the OPORD (Joint Pub 
5-00.2: 1999). Figure 7 captures the Execution Planning phase of CAP. 
JCS: 
• Issues Alert Order 
Phase V: 
Execution Planning 




• Converts COA into OPORD 
















• SORTS Reports 
CINC: 





• Publishes OPORD 
I 
NCA: 
• Authorizes & 
implements OPORD 
Figure 7: Phase V Execution Planning 
A checklist for CAP Phases III-V is provided in Appendix C. The final phase 
(Phase VI) of the crisis action planning process is execution. Once the NCA authorizes 
the release of the Execute Order, the CJCS publishes the order. The Execute Order 
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directs deployment and employment of forces. The CINC executes the OPORD, 
monitors the force deployment, and controls the employment of forces. 
The major difference between crisis action planning and deliberate planning is 
time sensitivity. Deliberate planning is a collaborative process and involves the 
supported CINC, JCS, supporting commands, and associated defense agencies. Senior 
officers conduct strategic planning at the JCS and CINC levels, but as the planning rolls 
down to the supporting commands the ranks and positions of planners vary. Many 
civilian planners are employed by the military to provide continuity and experience. 
Several of the civilian planners are prior active duty planners and operators. The role of 
enlisted planner is usually one that manages and operates the planning databases and 
systems, such as JOPES. 
Due to the very nature of an unexpected crisis, time is of the essence and planning 
involvement becomes limited. Expedient planning and estimations rely heavily upon 
communication from the NCA down to the CINC and supporting commands. ALP's goal 
is to provide for rapidly available information at all levels of the planning process 
(Carrico: 1999). The EAF concept depends on timely and efficient support. 
EAF Concept 
The Air Force is divided into ten Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF), each roughly 
equivalent in capability, among which deployment responsibilities are rotated. Each AEF 
is required to be able to project highly capable and tailored force packages. Upon short 
notice, the AEF is tasked to respond anywhere around the world, to a wide range of 
possible operations, largely from the continental United States (CONUS). This concept 
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requires the ability to deploy and employ quickly, adapt rapidly to changes in the 
scenario, and sustain operations indefinitely. To meet the demanding timelines, units 
must be able to deploy and set up logistics production processes quickly. Deploying 
units will, therefore, have to minimize deployment support. This, in turn, demands the 
support system be able to ensure the delivery of sufficient resources when needed to 
sustain operations (Tripp: 1999). Support systems are plentiful in the joint planning 
environment. Integration and compatibility are major issues concerning support systems. 
Tools Used in Current Process 
Webster's defines a tool as "something used in performing an operation or 
necessary in the practice of a vocation or profession" (Merriam-Webster: 2000). The 
war planning process involves several different types of tools. These tools range from 
grease pencils and white boards to the latest in advanced technology. The interview 
phase of this research (presented later) will discuss the tools that are currently used. 
The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the principal 
system used by the Department of Defense (DoD) that translates policy decisions into 
operational plans supporting national objectives. JOPES is the primary source for 
deployment/redeployment planning and execution resource information (Joint Pub 5- 
03.1: 1993). It is a means for the CINC to control the JTF's deployment/redeployment 
flow. JOPES has the capability to access the Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS) and reflects near real-time deployment flow information (Joint Pub 5-03.1: 
1993). JOPES is the integrated, joint, conventional command and control system used by 
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the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) to conduct joint planning, 
execution, and monitoring activities (Joint Pub 5-03.1: 1993). 
JOPES consists of five basic planning functions: threat identification and 
assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, detailed planning, and 
implementation (Joint Pub 5-03.1: 1993). Military planners identify the requirements for 
forces and resources to accomplish the mission and compare them to actual forces and 
resources available. The JOPES Core database links a number of separate applications to 
create the JOPES system. The logistics community is involved with the GTN interface. 
This interface allows for the continued supply of transportation command and control 
information to the Joint Deployment community by providing an interface to the GCCS 
Scheduling and Movements (S&M) Core Database on the GCCS platform (Joint Pub 5- 
03.1: 1993). This interface provides a method of moving data from a non-JOPES system 
to the JOPES environment. 
CINCs, JTF commanders, senior-level decision-makers and their staffs at the 
National Command Authority level, and the remaining members of JPEC all use and 
benefit from the JOPES system. During peacetime, JOPES is used to produce OPLANs, 
contingency plans, and concept summaries involved in the deliberate planning process 
(Joint Pub 5-03.1: 1993). In crises, JOPES is used for CAP to produce operation orders. 
During the CAP process combatant commanders use JOPES to determine the best course 
of action. JOPES has been used for over twenty years to develop the TPFDD and has 
become an integral part of GCCS (Joint Pub 5-03.1: 1993). 
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Global Transportation 
Network (GTN) gives its customers located anywhere in the world a seamless, near-real- 
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time capability to access and employ transportation and deployment information (Joint 
Pub 4-01.1: 1996). GTN is an automated command and control information system that 
supports the family of transportation users and providers, both DoD and commercial, by 
providing an integrated system of in-transit visibility information and command and 
control capabilities (Joint Pub 4-01.1: 1996). GTN collects and integrates transportation 
information from selected transportation systems. 
Command centers consisting of planners, operators, and logisticians use GTN in 
peacetime and wartime operations. Most importantly USTRANSCOM uses GTN as a 
business operations tool that allows the commander to exercise authority and direction 
over assigned forces (Joint Pub 4-01.1: 1996). There are several different inputs to the 
GTN network. They include: G081/Broker Aircraft Maintenance System, Joint Air 
Logistics Information System (JALIS), Air Mobility Command Deployment Analysis 
System (ADANS), Asset Management System (AMS), Groups Operational Passenger 
(GOPAX) System, Consolidated Aerial Port System II (CAPS-II), Global Air 
Transportation Execution System (GATES), Worldwide Port System (WPS), Integrated 
Booking System (IBS), Continental United States Freight Management (CFM), Defense 
Transportation Tracking System (DTTS), Transportation Coordinator Automated 
Command and Control Information System (TCACCIS), Cargo Movement Operations 
System (CMOS), Transportation Coordinator's-Automated Information for Movements 
System II (TCAIMS II), and Defense Automated Addressing System (DAAS) (Joint Pub 
4-01.1: 1996). 
The Air Force's Logistics Module (LOGMOD) provides major commands 
(MAJCOMs), base-level logistics planners, and base-level unit deployment managers 
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(UDMs) with the capability for mobility, reception planning and execution to support 
worldwide deployment offerees (AFI10-403: 1998). It provides a responsive, user- 
friendly system for mobility planning in an on-line format. LOGMOD is a subsystem of 
the Contingency Operation/Mobility Planning and Execution System (COMPES) (AFI 
10-403: 1998). LOGMOD is crucial for logistics planners and unit deployment 
managers to plan for worldwide deployment of personnel, supplies, and equipment to 
meet various exercises, real-world contingencies, and wartime tasking. Its standard 
input, editing, and storage capabilities produce the materiel lists, packing and load lists, 
and the manpower interface products for Unit Type Code (UTC) packages formatted for 
base mobility plans (AFI 10-403: 1998). LOGMOD helps maintain combat units and 
their materiel support in constant deployment readiness. 
LOGMOD is built around four major components: Logistics Force Packaging 
(LOGFOR), Logistics Planning Module (LOGPLAN), Deployment Schedule of Events 
(DSOE), and Unit Deployment Management (UDM) (AFI 10-403: 1998). LOGFOR is 
an unclassified global module that contains information on deployment packages. 
LOGFOR contains data describing the capability of a particular mobility package (AFI 
10-403: 1998). It does not link information about a particular mobility package to a 
particular unit, nor does it contain any classified planning information contained in the 
JCS operational plans. 
LOGPLAN is an unclassified module that assists with mobility and reception 
planning (AFI 10-403: 1998). Although the linkage of OPLAN information to a 
particular unit (such as certain Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) is 
classified, the module is able to remain unclassified by using pseudo identifications that 
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do not reveal classified information (AFI10-403: 1998). The DSOE module is an 
unclassified output from LOGPLAN. DSOE provides the wing-level user the capability 
of scheduling and monitoring deployment actions in support of the planned objective 
(AFI 10-403: 1998). 
The UDM is an unclassified module that assists the Unit Deployment Manager 
with tracking personnel and equipment deployment information (AFI 10-403: 1998). It 
provides the Unit Deployment Manager the capability to input, update and process 
reports on deployment training, shots, line numbers, and all other necessary deployment 
information. 
LOGMOD interfaces with other external systems. Interfaces are accomplished 
via direct electronic data transfer, diskette, Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(NIPRNET), hard copy documentation, and other data transmission means (AFI 10-403: 
1998). There are no classified automated data transfers required or permitted in 
LOGMOD. LOGMOD is an integral part of the GCCS. 
The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is an automated information 
system designed to support deliberate and crisis planning. GCCS is composed of several 
mission applications built to a single common operating environment networked to 
support sharing, displaying, and passing of information and databases (Joint Pub 6-0: 
1995). The GCCS infrastructure supports a communications capability providing data 
transfer facilities among workstations and servers (Joint Pub 6-0: 1995). The Secret 
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) provides connectivity between GCCS 
sites. The SIPRNET is the secret layer of the Defense Information Systems Network 
(DISN). 
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War fighting CINCs use GCCS as a planning system at the joint level to acquire 
information regarding the status of forces and resources. It also has inputs for 
intelligence data about enemy forces. CINCs also use GCCS to distribute their guidance 
and decisions, such as Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) (Joint Pub 6-0: 1995). 
Another software tool designed to aid the war planner in the decision making 
process is the Joint Planning Execution Toolkit (JPET). The Joint Planning Execution 
Toolkit is a distributed, collaborative planning software application tool that uses the 
common operating environment of the GCCS (JTO: 1998). One of JPET's decision 
tools is the Course of Action Selection Tool (COAST). COAST provides the war planner 
with viable COA alternatives based on available forces and grounded in joint doctrine 
principles. Not being a Windows based program is one of JPET's main disadvantage. 
Tools can also be classified as repositories of knowledge that an organization possesses. 
The concept of the use of knowledge as a tool will be explained in later sections. The 
architecture that ALP is developing seeks to leverage information tools to supply 
knowledge to the decision makers. 
ALP History 
DARPA's objectives for ALP are summed up in four main categories. These 
objectives are automated logistics plan generation, real-time situation assessment, end-to- 
end movement control, and rapid supply (Carrico: 1999). 
Automated logistics plan generation is the capability to automatically generate 
logistics plans from notional to refined levels of item description and synchronize 
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operations and logistics actions (Carrico: 1999). The goal is to tightly link the J3 and J4 
planning and execution processes and to produce a "Level-5" TPFDD in one hour. 
Real-time situation assessment is the capability for logisticians at all echelons to 
rapidly assess the logistics situation by converting logistics data into information-rich 
visualizations to understand the current situation and project future states (Carrico: 
1999). The goal of this objective is to identify plan deviations within 15 minutes and 
update a plan within 10 minutes of the deviation, through the creation and use of plan 
sentinels. 
End-to-end movement control provides the capability to maintain end-to-end 
control of the transportation/logistics pipeline through the automated development of 
responsive transportation plans, schedules, and continuous monitoring techniques 
(Carrico: 1999). Its goal is to realize minimal staging and globally optimize air and 
sealift resources. 
Rapid supply is the capability to maintain interoperable connectivity and access 
between the DoD and commercial vendors, suppliers, and manufacturers (Carrico: 
1999). This objective will increase materiel readiness and decrease cycle times 
associated with satisfying materiel requirements while reducing DoD inventory and 
overhead costs. The end result is to provide the capability to accomplish continuous 
demand assessments and sourcing against DoD and commercial inventories (Carrico: 
1999). 
ALP is a multi-phase program which will culminate in the demonstration of a 
complete, end-to-end, factory to foxhole, multi-echelon, prototype system across the 
functional areas of course of action Development, sustainment, transportation, and rapid 
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supply for continuous planning, execution monitoring and rapid replanning of a major 
force deployment from the continental United States to in-theater final destination 
(Carrico: 1999). One way to leverage ALP into the war planning process is by capturing 
knowledge assets of the current process. 
Knowledge Management 
To understand knowledge management one must first understand the evolution of 
knowledge. Data is the foundation of knowledge, however it is meaningless unless it can 
be interpreted and transformed into information. Once data is transformed into 
information, then it can be put into use. When information is put into use, it creates a 
level of knowledge. The following definitions expound upon this progression of 
knowledge (Cho, Jerrell, Landay: 2000). 
Data: a set of discrete, objective facts commonly seen in the structured 
records of transactions. Data is unorganized but consists of independent 
numbers, w ords, s ounds, o r im ages t hat c an b e e asily b e s tructured o n 
machines, Data by itself, provides no judgment or interpretation of events. 
Information: when data becomes organized, patterned, grouped, and or 
categorized; thus increasing depth of meaning to the receiver. 
Knowledge: richer and more meaningful information put into productive 
use, e.g. best practices. Knowledge is derived from information. 
Explicit or Implicit knowledge: knowledge that is easily communicated 
between people in the form of hard data, formulas, and written or 
universal procedures. Examples would include: books, papers, policy 
manuals, and lessons learned. 
Tacit Knowledge: found in the heads of employees and experiences of 
customers. Contains insights, intuitions, and hunches. Tacit knowledge is 
highly personal, hard to formalize, and deeply rooted in a person's actions 
and experiences as well as their ideals, values and emotions. 
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Knowledge management takes place once knowledge is put into use. Knowledge put into 
use produces value and this value can be termed intellectual capital. "Converting that 
knowledge into something that has value is what we have come to known as intellectual 






Figure 8: Knowledge Hierarchy 
Information technology capitalizes on providing organizations with the 
information they require to satisfy their needs. While information technology is one way 
for people to capture information, to gain knowledge they need to attain understanding. 
Information alone is of little value to a decision maker. Information combined with 
objective reasoning and judgment gained form experience produces sound decisions. 
This combination and transformation of information to applied knowledge creates value 
or intellectual capital (Edvinsson and Malone: 1997). Information remains somewhat 
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constant, it is the processes used to support information requirements that change rapidly. 
Fully understanding information processes is a way to leverage the value of knowledge. 
The following story reveals how the Cro-Magnons leveraged the value of knowledge, 
(Edvinsson and Malone: 1997): 
Intellectual capital, of course, has always been a decisive factor in the rise 
of civilizations, organizations, and people. For at least 60,000 years our 
ancestors, the Cro-Magnons, lived side by side with the Neanderthals. 
Then, about 30,000 years ago, the Neanderthals disappeared. 
Why did one species survive and the other parish? Both used tools and 
language, but the Cro-Magnons had a lunar calendar. Soon they 
correlated the passing days with the migratory patterns of bison, elk, and 
red deer. This insight was dutifully recorded on cave-wall paintings and 
in sets of 28 notches on reindeer antlers. 
Hungry for meat, the Cro-Magnon was taught that all he had to do was 
wait at a river crossing on certain days, spear in hand. In the meantime, 
the Neanderthals appear to have unwisely scattered their men and their 
scarce resources poorly. They perished. Intellectual capital made a 
difference. 
This story displays the importance of leveraging knowledge for survival. Just as a 
commercial organization leverages the value of knowledge to gain a competitive edge 
over their competitors, the military leverages the value of knowledge to maintain the 
competitive edge over enemy forces. Profit is the motivation for the commercial 
organization compared to national security as the motivation for the military. 
Identifying Knowledge 
The war planning process can be broken down into several areas of knowledge. It 
is the specific knowledge held by each member of the war planning community that 
distinguishes them from one another. The application of this knowledge is what creates 
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value. By identifying the knowledge assets within the war planning process, value can be 
assigned to the specific components of intellectual capital. To sell the value that ALP can 
bring to the war planner, the next step must be to identify the knowledge assets within the 
war planning process. Quinn suggests that professional intellect in an organization 
operates on four levels (Quinn: 1998): 
Cognitive Knowledge (or know-what) is the basic mastery of a discipline 
that professionals achieve through extensive training and certification. 
This knowledge is essential, but usually far from sufficient. 
Advanced skills (know-how) translate "book learning" into effective 
execution. The ability to apply rules of a discipline to complex real-world 
problems is the most widespread value-creating professional skill level 
System understanding (know-why) is deep knowledge of the web of 
cause and effect relationships underlying a discipline. It permits 
professionals to solve beyond the execution of tasks to solve larger and 
more complex problems - and to create extraordinary value. Professionals 
with know-why can anticipate subtle interactions and unintended 
consequences. The ultimate expression is highly trained intuition - for 
example, the insight of a seasoned research director who knows 
instinctively which projects to fund and exactly when to do so. 
Self-motivated creativity (care-why) consists of will, motivation, and 
adaptability for success. Without self-motivated creativity, intellectual 
leaders can lose their knowledge advantage through complacency. 
The first step in managing organizations knowledge is through identification and 
categorization. Once the organizations knowledge has been identified and categorized, 
then knowledge management can begin. The war planning process is an iterative process 
that involves several different people supporting multiple planning horizons. The war 
planner possesses knowledge from doctrine, formal training, and past experiences. 
Functional knowledge from several other disciplines mix into the war planning process. 
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The ALP architecture enables the accesses of these areas of functional knowledge on a 
real-time basis. 
Knowledge Analysis Methods 
War planners posses a vast amount of tacit knowledge that is difficult to harness. 
It is important in the war planning environment to bridge the gap between strategic plans 
to tactical plans by the transfer of tacit knowledge. The knowledge audit is one method 
that helps capture tacit knowledge. Liebowitz asserts that the knowledge audit plays a 
key role in the knowledge management strategy for an organization (Liebowitz: 1999). 
One o f t he critical first s teps in t he kno wledge m anagement a rea is t o 
conduct a kno wledge a udit. S ome p eople v iew t he kno wledge a udit a s 
being the business needs assessment, cultural assessment, and an 
examination of what knowledge is needed, available, missing, applied, and 
contained. In the same manner that a manufacturing company will first 
inventory its intellectual capital assets, an aspiring "knowledge 
organization" should also inventory its intellectual capital assets. 
Organizations can assign internal systems, information systems, networks, and culture as 
valuable assets that appreciate with time. The challenge is to properly manage this 
intellectual capital that creates value for the organization. One example of creating value 
is the transformation of human skill or expertise into structural assets. This 
transformation is one of the objectives of the ALP architecture. The knowledge audit can 
serve as this inventory to help identify the knowledge assets of an organization. 
Karl Wiig defines a knowledge audit as a survey and characterization of the status 
of knowledge in an organization (Wiig: 1995). Wiig offers various methods for auditing, 
surveying, eliciting, and analyzing knowledge in his book, Knowledge Management 
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Methods, Practical Approaches to Managing Knowledge. Table 1 provides 
characteristics of each method considered for this research. The characteristics included 
in the table include: 
• what the method is used for 
• which further work it may support 
• what it provides 
• what the analysis is based upon 
• which other analysis methods it may rely upon 
• whether it can be considered a detail or overview method 
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•Used to obtain broad overview of an operation's knowledge status -a "knowledge audit."   ! 
•May support further KM work in almost any are 
•Provides responses from many areas and viewpoints categorized as finely as the initial 
questionnaire specifies 
•Analysis is based on completed responses 
•May also rely upon interviews to determine key areas of interest for questionnaire 
•Broad overview method 
Knowledge Mapping 
(KMap) 
•Used to develop concept maps as hierarchies or nets 
•May support KS&P, BKA, etc. 
•Provides highly developed procedure to elicit and document concept maps from KWs, 
particularly experts and masters 
•Analysis is based on interactive work session/interviews & self-elicitation 




•Used to understand, often in great detail, which knowledge is present and the role it plays 
in the TBP. 
•May support preparing for other knowledge analyses and KBS developments 
•Explores and describes activities, tasks, artifacts, and culture including multi-dimensional 
relationships between these within the TBP and adjacent business processes. 
•Analysis is based upon observation, interviews, simulation 
•May rely or precede VPA BKA, KMap, and CFKA. 
•Knowledge acquisition and overview methodology 
KADS-Object Analysis 
(KOA) 
•Used to obtain overview of an enterprise's intelligent decision-making functions & 
knowledge required 
•May support gaining understanding of the enterprise's reliance on knowledge and which 
knowledge is used for particular business purposes 
•Characterizes & describes broad decision-making functions of the enterprise with focus 
on the TBP and its functions as intelligent objects. Also characterizes the knowledge 
involved in broad terms. 
•Analysis is based on interviews & interactive work sessions 
•May rely upon TEA BKA, and surveys 
•Knowledge overview and acquisition methodology 
Verbal Protocol Analysis 
(VPA) 
•Used to identify knowledge elements, fragments, & atoms 
•May support applications other knowledge analyses or development of KBS 
•Provides knowledge details such as production rules, concepts, perspectives, analyses, 
decisions, judgments, and methodologies used to perform K-I tasks. 
•Analysis is based on verbal protocols produced while workers undertake complex tasks 
•May rely on TEA 
•Detailed knowledge acquisition methodology. 
Imported abbreviations in this table: TBP - Target Business Process; KBS - Knowledge Based System; BPR - 
Business Process Redesign; KW - Knowledge Worker; K-I - Knowledge-Intensive 
Table 1 displays only a portion of the methods that Wiig mentions. He also 
reveals that other methods such as the Delphi technique for surveys can also be used for 
knowledge analysis. The comparison of the techniques listed above and the others 
brought up in Wiig's book provided a basis for selecting the knowledge audit method. 
The knowledge audit gives a broad overview of the extent, nature and structure of an 
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organization. The knowledge audit strongly complements the knowledge mapping 
methodology by identifying relevant knowledge repositories that provide hard data to 
strategic plans for knowledge processing (Liebowitz: 1999). 
Knowledge Mapping 
Knowledge mapping is used to help discover the location, ownership, value and 
use of knowledge assets, to learn the roles and expertise of people, to identify constraints 
to the flow of knowledge, and to highlight opportunities to leverage existing knowledge 
(Grey: 1999). The principles of knowledge mapping are to understand that knowledge is 
transient, to sanction, establish boundaries, recognize and locate all forms of knowledge 
in processes, relationships, policies, and people. 
A knowledge map is a visual aid to help navigate explicit information and tacit 
knowledge, showing the importance and relationships between knowledge stores and 
dynamics. The outcome of the knowledge map portrays the sources, flows, constraints 
and sinks (bottlenecks or losses) of knowledge within an organization. After this map is 
constructed, it can be used as a tool for extended knowledge management. Management 
could use this tool to see how it compares and aligns with its strategic goals, core 
competencies, and process knowledge. 
Summary 
War planners operate in a dynamic environment with great responsibility on every 
decision they make. Knowledge management is a methodology that can help enhance the 
war planning process.. In order to take advantage of these knowledge management 
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methods and tools a foundation must first be built. Capturing the knowledge assets of the 
campaign planning process will be the foundation for this research. A method of 
inventorying these assets is required after it is captured. One method for identifying this 
knowledge is through the use of a knowledge audit. Following the identification and 
inventory, further analysis can be conducted. 
The next step will be to map the inventoried knowledge to form a template to 
more detailed components. For instance, the construction of ALP as an expert system 
could protect and make more accessible this identified specific knowledge. Access to 
ALP, as an expert system, can be from a point and click operation on the map. This 
knowledge held by the war planner represents knowledge as an asset. 
Once the knowledge assets of the war planning process have been mapped, then 
comparison analyses for knowledge management activities can take place. This 
knowledge map can be maintained and used as tool to incorporate other detailed 
knowledge in specific areas. The visibility of knowledge in a manageable arena can 
become the focus of a growing and more detailed understanding of knowledge in the war 
planning process. Managing knowledge requires people to be aware of critical processes 
supporting key functions capable of achieving organizational success. It is the theory of 
this researcher that the most appropriate method for capturing the knowledge in the war 
planning process must be one that identifies how the knowledge war planner contributes 




An inductive theory-based research approach was used in this thesis. Inductive 
research develops general principles or relationships that might explain specific 
observations, anecdotes, or research results (Dooley: 1995). This approach moves from 
the particular to the general and concludes with the development of theory. 
This chapter describes the methodology used in analyzing the CAP process. In 
order to identify the unique knowledge assets of the CAP process this research was 
divided into three phases; identification of knowledge categories, knowledge audit, and 
comparative analysis. This research methodology was structured to recognize the hidden 
or intangible information assets in the crisis action planning process. Once these assets 
are identified, their value can be compared. Each of these phases will now be discussed 
in greater detail. 
Identification of Knowledge Categories 
The identification of knowledge categories in the crisis action planning process 
involved two methods, a literature review and face-to-face interviews. The literature 
review provided the foundation and principles that guide the war planning process. 
Specifically, the CAP process was broken down into six phases as discussed in chapter 
two. Interviews were conducted with SMEs to obtain general process knowledge used to 
help develop the general interview questionnaire (Liebowitz: 2000). The questionnaire 
developed for the face-to-face interviews can be found in Appendix B. 
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The literature review assisted in capturing a foundation of knowledge that most 
war planners acquire through formal and informal training. Doctrine that embodies the 
cultural mindset and beliefs of the people in the organization facilitates the 
communication process of sharing information and knowledge to make decisions that 
achieve desired results. This fundamental knowledge was used to help structure the 
initial questions used on the first round of interviews. The goal of the first round 
interviews was to capture the general development of the war planning process. Several 
open-ended questions were used to capture as much knowledge as possible. 
Interview Participants. Once the literature review was complete, the next step 
was to identify the participants for face-to-face interviews. The intent of the face-to-face 
interviews was to identify knowledge categories and to set the framework for the 
questionnaire to be used in phase two of the research. The philosophy for the face-to- 
face interviews was to gather as much information as possible with the understanding that 
specific areas of this research would not be addressed until the second phase 
questionnaire was administered. 
The sample size for the first phase of the research consisted of 25 active duty war 
planners from 10 different units and commands. This sample was chosen to represent 
war planners from the Air Force Headquarters (Checkmate, and War Plans and Mobility), 
Numbered Air Forces (9th AF, 12th AF), Major Commands (ACC, AFSOC), the Air 
Expeditionary Force Center, Air Warfare Center, Command and Control Test and 
Innovation Group (C2TIG), and the College of Aerospace Doctrine Research, and 
Education (CADRE) schoolhouse. 
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The exact demographics of the SMEs were not as much as a concern as the war 
planning experience level that they maintained. The ranks of the interview participants 
ranged from colonels to majors and included civilian employees. Since the aim of this 
research was to capture the operational planner's perspective, a majority of the interview 
participants had operational experience. However, logisticians were interviewed during 
this phase to capture both perspectives of the planning process. 
Interview Analysis. The open-ended questions used in the interviews and the 
literature review of the written policies and doctrine served as a foundation for the 
questionnaire used in the second phase of this research. These questions are listed in 
Appendix A. Based on the results from the interviews, the author chose to focus on the 
crisis action planning process at the Unified Command level. 
The overwhelming response from the Numbered Air Force and MAJCOM 
interviews was that by the time an operational order was sent to them most of the 
operational and logistical plans have already been established. This finding indicated that 
further operational and logistical planning would not be required, and that the initial 
assumptions and general strategy were based on the previous plans. To capture the 
knowledge of the interaction between the operational and logistical planners, the initial 
planning process of the CAP process was the focus for the knowledge audit in phase two 
of this research. 
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Knowledge Audit 
The purpose of conducting a knowledge audit is to take an inventory of all the 
possible knowledge categories in an organization or process. The audit tracks the inputs, 
outputs, flows, sinks, barriers, and stores (Liebowitz et. al: 2000). Knowledge flow 
analysis can be used to gain overview of knowledge exchanges, losses, or inputs of the 
task business processes or the whole enterprise. Once the knowledge audit is conducted, 
the knowledge mapping process can be used to produce a visual aid for further 
comparative analysis. 
Questionnaire Development. The validation of these knowledge categories was 
conducted using a knowledge audit questionnaire. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
knowledge audit is one of the critical first steps in the knowledge management area and is 
often viewed as being an examination of what knowledge is possessed, needed, and 
missing (Liebowitz et. al: 2000). The knowledge audit questionnaire used in this 
research effort was derived from a knowledge audit described by Liebowitz and others 
(2000). In this article, the authors describe a knowledge audit questionnaire used in a 
case study. The questionnaire used in this research had three overarching questions. The 
first question asked for war planners to list specifically the knowledge they possessed to 
do their job. The second question asked for war planners to list the missing knowledge 
they needed to do their job. The final question asked the war planner to list the 
knowledge they needed to do their job better. A sample of the complete questionnaire 
used is provided in Appendix B. 
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Questionnaire Participants. The questionnaire participants were chosen based on 
the analysis from the first phase face-to-face interviews. Plans from the top-down are 
made to reflect the objectives and goals of the parent organization. In the case of the 
military war planning environment, the objectives and goals are directed from the 
National Command Authorities. The CAP process directly involves the National 
Command Authorities interaction with the Unified Command planning staffs with the 
Joint Staff acting as a facilitator. Plans are estimates of what needs to be done and are 
executed in an environment of uncertainty. Knowledge made available in an accessible 
and timely manner will assist the planning staffs in producing plans that are more 
accurate. Risk will always be a factor in the planning process, but the minimization of 
risk is a priority of all planning processes. The prevention of risks and errors in the 
planning process can be greatly reduced if addressed early in the planning process. The 
CAP process was selected for this research with the goals of capturing the war planning 
process at the earliest stages of the planning process. 
The participants in the questionnaire consisted of personnel from the Joint Staff 
(J3), Air Force Headquarters (Checkmate), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Pacific 
Command (PACOM), and European Command (EUCOM). 
Questionnaire Analysis. The method used in this research to analyze the 
questionnaires was the knowledge audit method. Wiig states that a knowledge audit may 
identify the following (Wiig: 1993): 
• Information glut or lack of information 
• Lack of awareness of information elsewhere in the organization 
• Inability to keep abreast of relevant information 
41 
• Significant "reinventing the wheel" 
• Common use of out-of-date information, and 
• Not knowing where to go for expertise in a specific area 
This research will focus on identifying what knowledge is needed, what knowledge is 
available and missing, who needs this knowledge, and how this knowledge will be 
applied. The knowledge audit was conducted in the following steps and adapted from 
Liebowitz's et. al. article "The Knowledge Audit" (Liebowitz: 2000). 
Step one of the audit was to identify what knowledge currently existed in the war 
planning process of CAP. This was accomplished from phase one of this research to 
include the literature review and face-to-face interviews. The face-to-face interviews 
captured both knowledge obtained from the war planner's experience (tacit knowledge) 
and formal training (explicit knowledge). The information acquired from this step was 
used to determine existing and potential sinks, sources, flows, and constraints in the CAP 
process. 
Step two of the audit identified what knowledge was missing in the CAP process. 
This step of the audit analyzed the information received from the interviews to determine 
what knowledge the J3 planner needed to exchange with the J4 planner to achieve the 
desired CAP goals. 
The final step of the audit was to categorize the results to provide a foundation for 
the knowledge maps. These maps identify the taxonomy and knowledge in the CAP 




Once the results of the knowledge audit were analyzed, a comparative analysis 
was performed. Knowledge mapping methodology was implemented to provide visual 
representations of the comparative analysis. A knowledge map can capture and integrate 
the knowledge collected in a knowledge auditing process. It can also help bridge the gap 
personal knowledge assets and information technology assets. The comparative analysis 
used in this research was conducted by the visual representations of knowledge maps. 
The knowledge maps display the CAP process as it is written in defense doctrine 
and perceived by the operational planner (J3). The written guidance, used in this 
research, can be found in Joint Pub 5-0, 5-00.2, and 5-03.1 and summarized in chapter 
two. The inputs to this map were supplied from the literature review and the results and 
analysis of the knowledge audit. This map proves beneficial because it not only tracks 
the fundamental process flow but also attempts to capture all forms of knowledge 
possessed, missing, and desired and the relationships and interdependencies between 
knowledge sources. 
The knowledge maps will display the opportunity to leverage the ALP 
architecture to enhance the CAP process. These maps will be able to display how the gap 
can be bridged from the current process to "ideal" process. These maps not only hold 
summary level knowledge and relationships, but also act as a graphical user interface 
(GUI). The main goal of these maps are to highlight opportunities to leverage existing 
knowledge through the use of a computing architecture such as ALP. 
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Summary 
Discussion of the methodology provided the reader information on the process 
used for identifying the knowledge categories that were audited and then compared in 
this research. The first step of doing a comparative analysis is to clearly define the 
objects under comparison. 
The literature review and initial round of face-to-face interviews accomplished the 
objective of identifying the knowledge categories to further research. Once these 
knowledge categories were identified, they were audited or inventoried. 
The knowledge audit inventoried each knowledge category and presented a 
foundation for the comparative analysis. This process plays a key role in the 
identification of knowledge management strategy within an organization. When the audit 
identifies both explicit and implicit knowledge of the war planning process, the 
construction of the knowledge map can be used, as a tool to find the knowledge an 
organization needs more quickly. 
Knowledge mapping, as used in the comparative analysis phase of this research, 
can serve as a continually evolving process memory, capturing and integrating the key 
knowledge assets in the war planning process. Just as private industry faces the needs to 
be more agile, to anticipate threats and opportunities, to react faster, and to be more cost 
effective, the war planning process faces these hurdles. The main difference is that 
private industry is motivated financially to gain market advantage and the war planning 





This section analyzes the results generated from this study. Each part of the CAP 
process was disaggregated into decision level activities. After these processes were 
broken down, they were then examined. The current CAP process as described by formal 
publications was already presented in the literature review. Next, the current CAP 
process, as defined by SME interviews, was analyzed and will be presented. Current 
issues that arose during the interview process will be presented and discussed. Finally, 
the CAP process-with the ALP architecture applied, will be explored. While the body of 
this chapter will refer only to excerpts form the process maps, a complete listing can be 
found in Appendices F through I. 
What is the Current CAP Process According to SMEs? 
The current CAP process was determined by face-to-face interviews and email 
surveys with subject matter experts (SMEs). The information identified from this process 
was later inventoried by means of the knowledge audit methodology. After the 
knowledge audit categorized the different knowledge assets and process knowledge 
pools, the knowledge mapping foundation was set. The knowledge audit is a static 
process that captures the thoughts and ideas of the SME at a snapshot in time. 
Knowledge maps are dynamic in nature and could be applied to a wide variety of 
scenarios and time spans. The views of each level of the decision making process will be 
included in each distinct phase of the CAP process. 
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IDEF Modeling 
The Integrated Definition (IDEF) methodology was used to construct the 
knowledge maps in this research. The IDEF technique was designed to provide a 
multitude of viewpoints required to describe business processes and software lifecycle 
processes (Hanrahan: 1995). The Air Force has used the IDEF methodology in several 
software system development efforts. Figure 9 displays the basic notations and 








Activity: Actions transforming inputs into 
outpits 
Input: The items tiansfoimed into ou(>utsby 
the activities 
Output: Product generated by the activity from 
the inputs 
Control: Riles or guillines defining how inputs 
are transformed into outputs 
Mechanism: The person, equipment, or 
software performing th e activity 
Figure 9: IDEF Model 
The basic IDEF model maps activities that transform inputs into outputs while 
under the influence of controls and mechanisms (Hanrahan: 1995). Controls are 
standards or policies that guide the process. Mechanisms are the agents (people, tools, or 
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systems) that carry out the actions of the process. The IDEF technique allows for the 
decomposition of diagrams from general processes to detailed descriptions of activities. 
The IDEF process mapping technique will be used for the remainder of this research. 
Phase III, COA Development. The initial step of the CO A Development phase 
reflects the way it is written in policy. The NCA either decides to take no action, delay 
decision in light of further information, use non-military action, or progress with the CAP 
process and utilize military options (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). Two of the five 
organizations interviewed in this section, Checkmate and JCS, play active roles in 
communicating with the NCA. 
Checkmate is an Air Force organization based in the Pentagon, which operates as 
a pool of functional war planning experts to assist and advise the JCS on military 
alternatives. They are not in the formal chain of command nor do they have any 
authority in the decision making process of CAP. Checkmate plays a significant role in 
coordinating planning efforts between CINCs and supporting CINCs as required. 
Depending on the severity of the crisis, Checkmate's role will vary. The more serious the 
situation, the more involved Checkmate will become in the process as they advise and 
coordinate with the JCS and the rest of the JPEC. 
The JCS's involvement varies upon the scale of the crisis faced by the supported 
CINC. If the crisis is insignificant, then the involvement in the COA Development 
process could be minimal or even nonexistent. When the JCS is involved with the COA 
Development process, they publish the -warning order and assist in relaying the guidance 
from the NCA to the supported CINC (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). The warning order tasks 
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the CINC to prepare the possible CO As and the commander's estimate, which contains 
the recommended COA. The JCS provides the supported CINC with the service and 
support they need to achieve their objectives. Their main deliverables are clear 
objectives, desired effects, exit strategy, and resource availability to the supported CINC. 
It was noted during the interview process that from time to time civilian leadership 
dictates national military strategy and creates ambiguous directions and objectives. 
When time criticality is the overriding constraint, deviations from the normal 
process take place. In such a case, the normal COA Development cycle is forgone and a 
specific COA is directed to the CINC from the NCA via the JCS (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 
1999). It is interesting to point out that when the NCA directs a specific COA, they must 
still interact with all of the support agencies and systems that are inputs to the COA 
Development process. 
When the COA Development is executed at the CINC level, there are normally 
three or more CO As developed to present to the commander. The goal is to present 
multiple, feasible COAs that have variety. Variety and feasibility are key factors when 
considering joint operations consisting of multi-service and multi-nation alternatives. 
The JPG's deliverable is a commander's estimate that includes the variety of developed 
COAs along with the recommended COA. 
The essential knowledge provided by the J4 to the J3 involves TPFDD feasibility 
during COA Development and analysis. Logistic constraints, such as resource 
availability, fuel capacities^ and munitions availability are other important factors that 
play a part in the development of a COA. The J4 also acts as a functional liaison with 
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Figure 10: Current Process for Phase III 
Responses varied little between interviews concerning the COA Development 
phase of CAP. The five war fighting CINCs each have specific geographical 
responsibilities that alter their planning processes to accommodate specific needs and 
objectives for their area of responsibility (AOR). The JCS stated that their underlying 
factors were time and situation dependency. JCS said they do not normally get involved 
with providing guidance and assistance to the CINC unless requested. One unique aspect 
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of the JCS role in the CAP process is their interaction with civilian agencies, especially 
during humanitarian missions. They supply a link between civilian agencies and the 
military agencies. Like the JCS, JFCOM's mission encompasses a high percentage of 
interaction with civilian agencies. 
JFCOM's mission has grown in recent years to include domestic crises. When a 
domestic crisis takes place, JFCOM works hand in hand with non-military crisis action 
organizations such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Because of 
their interactions with non-military agencies, a need exists for coordinated 
communication between the two agencies. 
JFCOM also must plan for the lead-time it takes to activate military reserve units 
that are involved with the course of action under consideration. Another factor that 
comes into play during the planning process for JFCOM is the activation of the National 
Guard. If activated, the question remains under whose control they will fall during times 
of crisis; the states or JFCOM. The CO A Selection process as described by the SMEs 
appears to track more closely to the written policy than the COA Development process. 
Phase IV, COA Selection. After the CINC submits the commander's estimate 
with the recommended COA, the JCS reviews and evaluates the COA and prepares 
recommendations for the NCA (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). Once the NCA approves the 
COA Selection, they direct the JCS to issue the alert order. The alert order, approved by 
the Secretary of Defense and issued to the supported CINC and other members of the 
JPEC, announces the COA selected and initiates the Execution Planning (Joint Pub 5- 
00.2: 1999). 
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Time dependency weighs heavily in the COA Selection process. The objectives 
of the COA become more specific if time allows for more coordination between the NCA 
and the supported CINC. Time and effectiveness are not necessarily directly related. It 
was noted during the interview at Checkmate that COA Selection during the CAP process 
could be as effective or even more effective than COA Selection under the deliberate 
planning process. Deliberate planning involves modeling, buy-in, and integration within 
JPEC. This process is aimed to achieve optimal plans but can result in compromise and 
inefficiencies. 
The main consideration in COA Selection is how closely does it meet the NCA's 
objectives and guidance. An analogy was used during the Checkmate interview, 
comparing the COA process to building a table. Certain tools are required to build a 
table properly. A carpenter would prepare a toolbox comprised of tools to accomplish 
the task of building the table. The toolbox would not include unnecessary tools that 
would have no value in the process. In like manner, the war planner would develop a 
COA that would match the NCA's objectives and guidance. Likewise, the NCA's 
selection determination would be based on the same criteria. 
The JCS could issue a planning order prior to the NCA selecting a COA. The 
planning order would have to be approved by the Secretary of Defense once a COA is 
selected by the NCA. JFCOM proclaimed in their interview that it was very common for 
the JCS to provide a heads-up on pending decisions at the NCA level. Figure 11 shows 
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Figure 11: Current Process for Phase IV 
Phase V, Execution Planning. The Execution Planning phase is initiated when the 
alert order is issued. The CINC transforms the approved COA into an OPORD. The 
CINC's OPORD provides further guidance for Execution Planning. The CJTF develops 
an OPORD and TPFDD, using JOPES procedures, based on the supported CINCs 
OPORD (Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility 
resources are identified and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format 
(Joint Pub 5-00.2: 1999). The end product of the Execution Planning phase is the 
OPORD. 
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The J3 and J4 relationship becomes closer as the J4 continually monitors logistics 
resource availability and location. The identification and availability of aerial ports of 
debarkation and sea ports of debarkation along with material handling equipment are vital 
information required for Execution Planning. The J4 liaison with USTRANSCOM 
becomes critical and more detailed at this phase of the planning process. 
USTRANSCOM develops transportation schedules. Continuous TPFDD refinement and 
validation become the primary responsibility of the J4. Any changes to the validated 
TPFDD must be coordinated through the supported CINC and USCINCTRANS. The J3 
begins to transition into developing air tasking orders (ATO), matching aircraft to targets, 
air refueling requirements, and air space control issues. The Execution Planning phase 
ends with the NCA's decision to implement the OPORD. Figure 12 captures the SME's 
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Figure 12: Current Process for Phase V 
Other Issues from SME's Responses 
The most common response from all of the SMEs concerned the unity of the 
planning process early in the initial phases of CAP. Not only does a tight, cohesive 
working relationship need to exist within the JPG but also between the JPG and the rest 
of JPEC. Of the three phases of CAP researched in this study, COA Development was 
viewed by the SMEs as the most critical time for the J3 and J4 relationship to coexist. It 
is during this time of COA Development the J3 relies on the J4 supplying TPFDD 
feasibility and airlift information. This was emphasized during one interview when a 
SME stated that if a vast amount of resources will be required to support a desired COA, 
most likely airlift would not be sufficient to handle the total capacity of the resources 
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required. In this case, sea lift must be sought to handle the vast amount of resources. 
The noted lag time for sea lift was estimated at twenty days from CONUS to an overseas 
location on average. Thus, the sea lift must be sourced and planned for early in the 
planning process to ensure the resources will be available when needed to support the 
CINCs objectives. 
The make up of the JPG in the CINCS in this study varied from one another. 
JFCOM mentioned that lawyers and medical personnel were especially important parts of 
the JPG when planning for domestic crisis. PACOM uses a 39 person Deployable Joint 
Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) to help jump-start JTFs conducting CAP. 
DJTFAC members, consisting of 0-4's and 0-5's from each J code, are specifically 
trained in CAP and JTF operations. One SME discussed the time spent training their 
CAP team members. During JTF exercises, the CINC spends one third of their time 
training members in academic classes and two thirds of their time in CAP (COA 
Development, selection, and war gamming) and OPORD development. Key traits for 
CAP team members were war planning training, real world experience, and theater 
knowledge. One SME quoted, "If advanced knowledge of the theater is obtained well in 
advance, one can research war planning needs within hours." 
The SME's noted that many of the tools used in the CAP process were outdated 
and did not meet their needs. White boards and markers were common links among all 
of the subjects interviewed. A logistician revealed that during the most critical time of 
CAP development, TPFDD development, there exists a great need to integrate the GTN 
and JOPES systems. Most every SME mentioned that the planning cycle must be 
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reduced to maintain our military superiority and that advanced technology needs to be 
developed to satisfy this deficiency. 
How Does the Current CAP Process Compare to What ALP Can Deliver? 
ALP has the capacity to significantly enhance the current CAP process. ALP can 
deliver a dynamically updated real-time access to information at its source (Carrico: 
1999). This access to the CAP process will allow for a distributed collaborative 
environment enabling rapid decision-making and command and control. This could 
potentially result in unity of effort, speed of command, and synchronization of forces. 
The specific areas in which ALP can enhance the current COA Development process 
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Figure 14: Phase III, TPFDD Development 
The three steps involved with TPFDD development (force planning, support 
planning, and transportation planning as shown in Figure 14) are separate independent 
processes. Each step must be accomplished prior to the start of the next. During the 
deliberate planning cycle, this iterative approach is acceptable. However, during the 
crisis action planning cycle this delays data access and response time. Different 
information systems are used in each phase of the TPFDD development. The integration 
of these planning phases is necessary for future war planning efforts. ALP's application 
as a collaborative planning tool that breaks down operations and logistics missions into 
identifiable tasks can satisfy this deficiency (Carrico: 1999). 
57 
ALP can also profoundly effect the COA Development phase through the use of 
its Mission Resource Value Assessment Tool (M-R VAT). The M-R VAT presents a 
new way to approach TPFDD development. TPFDD feasibility and validation play a 
vital role in optimizing the CAP process. TPFDDs are built upon the principle concept of 
Unit Type Codes (UTCs). UTCs are five-character alphanumeric codes that uniquely 
identify each type of unit of the Armed Forces (AFI10-403: 1998). UTCs are the basic 
building blocks of force deployment packages. Standard UTCs are built for bare base 
scenarios. Standard UTCs normally undergo a process called paring and tailoring. 
Paring and tailoring is a process where the UTC is transformed from the standard 
UTC to a custom UTC that meets the requirements of a deployment. The paring and 
tailoring process involves time and planning. During the CAP process, time is critical, 
and TPFDD development must be done expeditiously. ALP's M-R VAT breaks away 
from this norm and approaches the logistics support capability in an effective and 
efficient manner. The goal of M-R VAT is to bring what is needed most when it is 
needed most. The use of ALP's M-R VAT will speed up the TPFDD development and 
free airlift for other requirements sourced in the COA Development phase (Swartz: 
1999). 
During the COA Development phase, ALP will profoundly affect the decision 
making process at several levels of command and planning horizons. When the crisis 
first occurs, the NCA and JCS will have access to the appropriate readiness decision 
support systems to discern the feasibility and availability of resources for particular 
COAs. This access to such knowledge will allow them to make better and timelier 
decisions when the time sensitivity of the crisis does not permit the CINC to participate 
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in the development of the CO A. When the CINC is able to develop the COA through the 
normal process, the speed and continual assessment of the information provided on a 
real-time basis will allow for more optimal recommendations to the NCA. 
ALP's utilities will allow the NCA and JCS to validate the recommended COA, 
thus decreasing the time it takes to select a COA. Once the COA is selected and the JCS 
publishes the alert order, ALP will enable a shared access to the vital information held in 
the alert order for the entire JPEC. Figures 15 displays the planning order publishing 














n   a  n J 





Figure 15: Phase IV, Planning Order Published 
Figure 15 applies to all types of orders published during CAP. The JCS currently 
writes and publishes orders in a matter of hours. However, the process can be delayed if 
the approving authorities (Secretary of Defense or other delegated civilian politicians) are 
not available to sign them. The application of ALP as a distributive agent in the order 
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distribution process could greatly enhance and speed and accuracy of the current process 
(Carrico: 1999). Widespread distribution of orders would also benefit the planning 
process, as supporting agencies would also have the information much faster. 
During the Execution Planning phase, ALP's collaborative nature will allow for 
optimization of TPFDD and OPORD development at the CJTF level. One of the most 
significant obstacles in the current CAP process is the dynamics of TPFDD development. 
The J3 is heavily dependent upon the J4 to constantly stay abreast of TPFDD feasibility 
and resources. ALP's real-time visibility of resources will allow the JPG to transform the 
COA into an OPORD in an expedient manner. When the JCS publishes the OPORD 
once again, the JPEC will instantly have access to the pertinent information. Figures 16 
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Figure 17: Phase V, Execution Planning 
Once again, the application of ALP as a collaborative planning tool could speed 
up the validation and sourcing phase of Execution Planning. This application of ALP 
serves as a template for all other planning support systems. ALP's use as a template for 
planning support systems could not only expedite the current process but may allow for a 
smooth transition from the planning phases to the execution phase. After the TPFDDs 
are validated and sourced, shortfalls and limiting factors will instantly be known 
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throughout the joint operations planning community. This allows for a more optimal 
solution system wide. 
Future Air Campaign Planning 
In a paper written by Maris McCrabb, he discussed campaign planning for the 
future. He emphasized the need for planning and readiness to reduce the uncertainties of 
war. McCrabb states (McCrabb: 2001): 
.. .these are the capabilities we can exploit over our adversaries, whoever 
and wherever they maybe. First is our capability to achieve air, sea, and 
space superiority. Second is our ability to project force anywhere in the 
world—an ability that Air Force people call "global reach." Third is our 
capability to forcibly enter any theater, either through amphibious, 
airborne, or air assault "global power." We have this capability because 
we have technology—particularly stealth and precision—that no one else 
on earth can match, and we have people with the fortitude to see the task 
through. 
Besides possessing the physical ability to attack our enemies from all levels of 
strategic, operational, and tactical war, the DoD has the technology to win at infowar- 
information warfare fought in cyberspace. The US military has the advantage to observe 
better, decide faster, and act quicker than the enemy. This process is also referred to as 
the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop, coined by John Boyd. Boyd's assertions 
stated that one could paralyze an enemy by operating inside their OODA loop, meaning 
that the individual is operating at a faster cycle speed than the enemy (McCrabb: 2001). 
Time constraints and massive amounts of information slow down and enlarge the OODA 
loop. This presents a problem during the CAP process. The addition of decision support 
systems can provide decision makers with loads of information. However, the decision 
maker does not have the time to decipher that information. Information technology 
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systems should be built around those processes needs that offer the decision maker the 
precise information needed to achieve the desired objectives. 
ALPs integrative ability to converge several types of decision support systems 
will enable the decision maker to reduce the OODA loop and attain a distinct advantage 
over the enemy. ALP will provide the decision maker with the right information at the 
right time. ALP's M-R VAT is a planning aid that implements quantitative analysis to 
employ high-speed decision making. ALP not only provides the decision maker with 
ability to observe and orient at a much faster and effective manner, but through the 
application and analysis of ALP's M-R VAT the decision maker's decisions and actions 
can be accomplished more efficiently. The longer the planning cycle or OODA loop 
takes, the more outdated and unreliable the information becomes. ALP measures to 
reduce the planning cycle in all four areas of the OODA loop will produce optimal plans. 
In an article written by Steve Gordon, a technical director at the Air Force Agency 
for Modeling and Simulation, he writes about the future of military operations. 
Our Armed Forces can no longer prepare for primarily one enemy and a 
handful of potential conflict scenarios. Numerous data-gathering systems 
can help our forces maintain information superiority in combat. Yet, 
there is a downside here too. Information superiority cannot necessarily 
guarantee knowledge of the right information or assure correct decisions 
will be made. Information must be sorted, prioritized, analyzed, and 
presented using improved combat efficiency as the primary focus. 
Operational commanders need the right decision support tools to help 
them maintain information dominance, situation al awareness, and an 
accelerated decision cycle (Gordon: 2000). 
Gordons description of future military operations can be directly applied to the future of 
the campaign planning process. Just as his article states, information superiority does not 
necessarily provide knowledge. The current campaign planning decision support systems 
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provide an abundance of information; however, this information is not distributed in a 
collaborative manner to all planning agencies. Multiple steps in the phases of CAP rely 
on independent decision support systems. Through time and manual effort, this 
information is turned into knowledge and applied to the decision making process. 
It is ALP's goal to leverage this information, and supply knowledge assets to the 
decision makers at all planning horizons in a real-time setting. "Maintaining an 
information advantage and building a knowledge advantage over enemy forces will 
require new automated decision support tools, including some predictive modeling and 
simulation systems" (Gordon: 2000). As small scale contingencies arise, the need to 
maintain information superiority over our adversaries becomes more prevalent than ever 
before. ALP will provide the linkage between the operations and logistics planner during 
the CAP process to maintain the knowledge advantage over the enemy. 
Summary 
This chapter first analyzed and displayed the SME responses on their perception 
of the current CAP process. Differences between policy and the SME's assessments 
were annotated and expounded upon. ALP was then considered in the current CAP 
process where it was shown to be able to improve upon the decision making process 
based on its proposed objectives as stated by literature. Finally, the future of air 





The significance of this research was that it identified the need for improvements 
to reduce the campaign planning cycle time. The current campaign planning process is 
limited by the information made available to the decision-makers. Logistical issues are 
the major constraints in the campaign planning process. The specific focus of this 
research was aimed at the J3 and J4 relationship during crisis action planning (CAP). 
This chapter summarizes the conclusions of each phase of the research. The limitations 
of the methodology used in this research are discussed. Finally, recommendations and 
future research possibilities are introduced. 
Research Phases 
The first phase of the research involved a literature review and face-to-face 
interviews. This phase was used to identify knowledge from written defense policies, 
and establish a broad overview of the campaign planning process from subject matter 
experts (SMEs). The literature review outlined the campaign planning process and 
identified the roles and responsibilities of the members of the planning process. The 
face-to-face interviews provided a broad overview of the campaign planning process and 
streamlined the focus of this research. Based on the responses from the open-ended 
questions asked of the SMEs and ALP's underlying objectives, the focus of this research 
was directed towards the CAP process. Once the knowledge required for the CAP 
process was identified, the next phase of the research was conducted. 
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The second phase of the research sought to inventory the knowledge that exists in 
the CAP process. This phase was conducted by face-to-face and email interviews with 
SMEs that were involved with critical planning phases of CAP. These senior level 
decision-maker experts were selected due to the responses collected in the first phase 
interviews and literature review. The knowledge audit methodology was used to capture 
and categorize the knowledge contained and the knowledge needed in the CAP process. 
The results from this process showed the similarities and contrasts between the CAP 
process written in policy and the CAP process as experienced and perceived by the 
SMEs. Once this knowledge was identified, the final phase of this research was 
conducted. 
The final phase of this research compared the written CAP process, the SMEs 
perception of the CAP process, and the CAP process with the technology of ALP applied. 
Knowledge mapping was the methodology used to compare the results of Phase II of this 
research. This methodology displayed visual representations of the activities that exist in 
the CAP process. Knowledge maps are dynamic tools that capture and integrate the key 
knowledge assets that continually evolve in processes. The results acquired from this 
phase of the research addressed the goals of this research. 
Conclusions 
The primary goal of this research was to analyze the knowledge shared between 
the operational planner (J3) and logistics planner (J4) that is required to optimally 
execute the CAP process. The secondary goal was to answer the following research 
questions: 
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1. What is the process involved with the operational order (OPORD) 
generation? 
2. What deployment planning, campaign planning, and operational 
order generation tools are used today? 
3. What is the available knowledge in the CAP process? 
4. What is the required knowledge in the CAP process? 
5. To what extent does the value of ALP contribute to the CAP 
process, and where do the existing tools fall short? 
The results of this research suggest that a tight relationship between the J3 and J4 
planners must exist early and remain strong throughout the planning process. The Course 
of Action (COA) Development phase was deemed the most critical phase of CAP for the 
interaction and collaboration between the J3 and J4. The research demonstrated that 
there is no single source supporting information system used in the planning process. 
Due to this fact, much time is spent assessing resource availability and feasibility to 
support a desired COA. ALP can deliver dynamically updated, real-time access to 
information at its source in a distributed mode. This type of collaborative access to 
information during the CAP process allows for unity of effort, speed of command, and 
synchronization of forces. 
The process and tools involved in the OPORD generation were identified in 
Chapter IV of this research. The process and tools identified in the Phase II interviews 
with SMEs tracked closely to what was written in policy. Although the process is spelled 
out quite clearly, the application of the process can become difficult to execute. 
Communication from several different planning agencies comes into play during the 
execution of orders and plans. ALP can profoundly affect the dissemination of 
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information during the generation and execution of OPORDs. This widespread 
distribution of information will provide timely and accurate transfer of information for 
decision makers as well as support agencies to act upon. Tools used in the current 
process are antiquated and do not allow efficient collaboration to exist. The 
incorporation of ALP's M-R VAT as a decision support tool will significantly speed up 
the planning process resulting in a greater number of feasible COAs. 
The available and required knowledge in the CAP process was determined from 
the literature review and SME interviews. The results were presented in knowledge maps 
located in Chapter IV. These knowledge maps provide a dynamic tool that can adapt to 
process changes over time. The maps help identify the fundamental knowledge flows 
taking place during each of activity in the process. This tool can help bridge the gap 
between personal knowledge and information technology assets. The ultimate goal of the 
maps developed in this study is to highlight opportunities to leverage existing knowledge 
using ALP's architecture. 
The fundamental potential contribution of applying ALP in the campaign 
planning process is to maintain superiority over enemy forces. ALP's ability to converge 
several types of decision support systems will expedite the decision making process. Not 
only will the decision maker have the information quicker, they will have it more 
efficiently. Providing the decision maker the right information at the right time allows 
them to decide and act at a faster rate. ALP's architecture should enable a distinct 
advantage over the enemy's capabilities to plan and execute their operations. 
The theory built from this research can be categorized into three distinct areas: 
systems integration, information distribution, and speed. 
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I. Systems Integration. 
a) Current information systems used in the planning process lack compatibility 
and integration. Figure 14, in Chapter IV, displayed how the TPFDD development 
process involves three separate incompatible information systems to assess logistics 
feasibility of a selected combat force mix selection. This fragmented process delays the 
response time in the planning process. 
b) ALP's collaborative planning tool, OPSLOG, could bridge this existing gap 
and integrate existing planning information systems into one common operating system. 
II. Information Distribution. 
a) Information distribution during the CAP process does not meet the needs of the 
war fighters. Figure 15, in Chapter IV, displayed how orders are published during the 
CAP. Although there are information systems that distribute information, they are not 
standardized or user friendly. The subject matter experts interviewed in this research 
noted that by the time they can access a published order using an information support 
system, they have already been contacted by phone. A "Windows based" user-friendly 
information systems is needed to satisfy the war planners needs. 
b) ALP's "Windows based" Real Time Information Fusion process could fuse 




a) The time sensitivity of crisis action planning demands speed and accuracy. The 
designed process of deliberate plans to serve as a benchmark for crisis action planning, 
has failed to meet the unpredictable requirements to resolve modern day crises. The 
current planning relationship between the J3 and J4 often lacks continuity. 
b) ALP's M-R VAT could provide the link between the J3 and J4 planning staffs, 
which will optimize the crisis action planning process. 
Limitations 
An inductive approach to research was used in this paper. Inductive research is 
theory-building research. The purpose of inductive research is to discover the real scope 
of a problem and determine if future research is required. Inductive research involves 
both primary research methods (interviews and surveys) and secondary research methods 
(literature review), both of which were used in this research. The results of inductive 
research conclude with a theory. 
The main limitation to this approach to research remains that the results in 
themselves are not useful to the researcher. Although this is true, this method of research 
did provide significant insight into the CAP process. The results also cannot be 
generalized since they are not representative of the entire population being studied. The 
tendency of the respondents to answer positively is another possible research limitation. 
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Recommendations of Future Research 
Future research should build on the theory that ALP provides significant 
contributions to the war planning process. Now that a theory has been built, further 
research can test the validity of proposed hypotheses. The in-depth process knowledge 
revealed in the knowledge mapping technique used in this research can provide a tool to 
test and validate theory. In turn, further testing of theory will offer tangible results to the 
researcher. The application of current AFIT research to this proposed theory would 
provide a framework for real world application. 
A proposed method to test the theories of this research would be to apply ALP's 
architecture in a war planning environment during a Joint Expeditionary Force 
Experiment (or similar wartime simulation exercise) and compare it's functionality to the 
current systems used in the planning process. 
Summary 
The result of this research effort created a methodology and theory to be applied 
and tested by future research efforts. Defense policy and subject expert matter interviews 
described the generation of the operational order during crisis action planning and the 
tools used during this process. The knowledge maps constructed in this research 
identified the available and required knowledge in the crisis action planning process. 
These knowledge maps can be used as dynamic tools to test theory and adapt to changes 
in the war planning process over time. Finally, the knowledge maps identified the 
specific areas where ALP's projected capabilities could satisfy the war planners needs. 
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Appendix A: Interview Bullet Background Paper 
Purpose of this background paper, to provide the respondent with an overview of the 
topics of discussion to be addressed during the interview. 
Purpose of the interview: to obtain knowledge and understanding of the process and 
factors considered when selecting certain combat aircraft asset sets for theater 
deployment. 
• US AF now operates under the expeditionary concept 
o   Deploy small contingent of aircraft, 36 fighter and 2-6 bomber assets per set 
o   May be expected to commence aerospace missions immediately upon arrival 
o   Campaign will require several types of aerospace missions, defined in 
AFM 1-1 
• Our purpose is to look ahead beyond current prepackaged forces 
o   A tailored force for each scenario 
o   Bring everything you need but only what you need 
o   Calculate time-phase requirements; spin up to fight from day zero.. .no more 
"closure" offerees 
• Please walk through a complete planning process for expeditionary force contingency 
deployment 
o   Realizing there are several layers of planning and decision-making, your 
views at your level are of prime importance in this study 
o   What is the fundamental process of selecting aircraft types to support a 
campaign? 
o   In determining the proper aircraft mix to be deployed and in planning for their 
deployment, what factors do you look at? 
• Focus on identified factors 
o   What makes these important? 
o   Is there anything that may affect this factor.. .underlying sub-factors? 
o   How do these factors relate to each other and the overall process? 
• Conclusion 
o   Any other factors that have not been identified that you feel are important, no 
matter level? 
o   Any important topics we did not discuss? 
o   Any contacts you know ofthat I should talk to regarding this research? 
• Soon, a second phase of research will begin. Your continued support will be greatly 
appreciated. 
o   The second phase will be quickly-accomplished email questionnaires to 
identify specific knowledge in the war planning process—your support will be 
crucial 
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Appendix B: Interview Questionnaire 
Purpose of the interview: to obtain knowledge and understanding of the process and 
factors considered when selecting certain combat aircraft asset sets for theater 
deployment. 
• Given a Crisis Action Planning scenario, the focus of this research will be on 
Course of Action (COA) Development, CO A Selection, and Execution Planning 
• Compare the CAP process to the Deliberate Planning process 
• Understanding that COAs can be developed from a Force Module Package, a 
partial Force Module Package, or from the ground up. 
o   This research will look ahead beyond current prepackaged forces; a 
tailored force for each scenario. 
o   Bring everything you need but only what you need. 
o   Calculate time-phase requirements; spin up to fight from day zero.. .no 
more "closure" offerees. 
• Walk through the CAP planning process: 
o   What is the Air Campaign Planner's role in the COA Development? 
■ Responsibilities? 
■ External Inputs? (How are they used? Who provides them?) 
■ Deliverables? 
■ Needs/Limitations? 
■ J4 Interaction? (What knowledge do you require from the J4?) 
■ Assumptions? 
o   What is the Air Campaign Planner's role in the COA Selection! 
■ Responsibilities? 
■ External Inputs? (How are they used? Who provides them?) 
■ Deliverables? 
■ Needs/Limitations? 
■ J4 Interaction? (What knowledge do you require from the J4?) 
■ Assumptions? 
o   What is the Air Campaign Planner's role in Execution Planning! 
■ Responsibilities? 
■ External Inputs? (How are they used? Who provides them?) 
■ Deliverables? 
■ Needs/Limitations? 
■ J4 Interaction? (What knowledge do you require from the J4?) 
■ Assumptions? 
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o   What is the make-up of the CAP team? 
o   How does the CAP process compare to the Deliberate Planning process? 
o   What is the fundamental process of selecting aircraft types to support a 
campaign? 
o   What "tools" are used in each of these planning phases? 
o   What are the most frequently asked questions? 
o   How dependent the CAP team on knowledge and experience? 
o   What is the percentage of time spent obtaining knowledge for the CAP 
process? 
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Appendix C; Checklist for CAP Phase III 
Phase III-COA Development 
D   What precisely must be accomplished in the crisis to strengthen or support the 
objectives established by the NCA? 
D   What are the general operations, intelligence, and logistics requirements to support 
the actions so as to bring about the NCA objectives? 
D   Do the military objectives identified take into account exploitable enemy 
vulnerabilities that are critical to the commander, joint task force's (CJTF) 
responsibilities and intent or are critical to the enemy's intent? 
D   From the CJTF's perspective, are the military objectives attainable? 
D   What is the commitment of the adversary to own CO A? 
D   What are the current rules of engagement (ROE) in the area? 
D   Do they need to be changed because of the current situation? 
D   Who should recommend changes? 
D    Is the authorization to use riot control agents required as an alternative to the use of 
deadly force to save lives? 
D   Has NCA approval been requested or received? 
D   Are riot control agents and protective equipment available to friendly forces? 
D   What forces are readily available and when could they arrive on the scene? 
D   What reception and operations support facilities are needed and available? 
D    What types and amounts of logistic support are available from friendly and allied 
nations? 
D    Are joint or multinational interoperability considerations involved? 
D    Is medical support adequate to support planned operations? 
D    Has direct liaison authorized been established, as applicable, within the operational, 
intelligence, and logistics nets, with the committed forces, supported and supporting 
commands (as applicable), and national agencies? 
D    What medical support is available in the objective area or provided for in the 
OPLAN or OPORD? 
D   Are special operations forces (SOF) required (e.g., United States Special Operations 
Command, theater special operations command, or host nation SOF)? 
D    What is the unit readiness of the available or allocated forces? 
D   What are the major constraints before forces can be committed? 
D    What is the status of geospatial information and services support within the area? 
D   What are the environmental (meteorological, oceanographic) support capabilities 
and constraints within the area? Who is coordinating environmental support? 
D   Will special CJCS-controlled communications assets, such as the joint 
communications support element, be required? 
D    Are Army or Air Force PSYOP units, or Navy supporting units, required? 
D    What is the command relationship of civil affairs (CA) and PSYOP forces? 
D   Will the use of deception operations enhance mission success for each COA being 
considered? 
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D   Have subordinate and supporting commands or agencies been tasked to enter JOPES 
data base requirements for development of deployment estimates by United States 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)? 
D   Has Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program support from the 
supported combatant commander been requested? 
D   Have plans for the use of space systems (e.g., for reconnaissance, surveillance, 
warning, navigation, communications, targeting, weather) been integrated into JTF plans? 
D   What is the status of strategic mobility resources and supporting elements? Are 
facilities, airports, seaports, and lines of communications capable of supporting the 
operation? 
D   What are the logistics factors that affect actions under consideration? 
D    Is aerial refueling required during deployment and/or employment? 
D   Will intermediate staging bases be required? 
D   What is the backup COA? 
D   What all-source intelligence resources are available? Has the full range of 
intelligence capabilities been employed to ensure maximum intelligence support to 
planning efforts by the supported combatant commander? By the NCA? Has CJTF 
declared emergency reconnaissance and implemented signals intelligence operational 
tasking authority? 
D   Has coordination been conducted with United States Space Command 
(USSPACECOM) to determine whether repositioning or launch of space systems is 
required for JTF operations? 
D   Will electronic warfare units, such as radar jammers or communications jammers, be 
required? 
D   Which airports and seaports are available to friendly forces? 
D   Are runway lengths and weight-bearing capacities adequate for the planned forces? 
D   Are pier capabilities and depth of water sufficient to accommodate sealift? 
D    Will use agreements need to be coordinated with other nations? 
D   Have sufficient contracting officers with adequate contracting authority been 
assigned? 
D   Has a sufficient amount of local currency been obtained to support the exercise or 
operation? 
D    Has local civilian labor support been acquired? 
D    Have adequate funds been identified to support the COA? 
D    Have procedures been established to ratify irregular purchases? 
D   What procedures must be established to protect information exchange between the 
United States and foreign forces and governments? 
D   Have standard JTF Special Technical Operations billets been activated and 
indoctrination conducted on special access programs? 
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Appendix D: Checklist for CAP Phase IV 
Phase IV-COA Selection 
D   What COA has been selected? Have the pros and cons of each alternative, with 
regard to enemy options, been fully and objectively assessed (wargamed)? 
D   What decisions have yet to be made? What changes to ROE are required? 
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Appendix E: Checklist for CAP Phase V 
Phase V-Execution Planning 
D    Is the mission clear? Is CJTFs intent clear? 
D    Are the ROE adequate for the JTF mission? 
D   Will the selected COA accomplish the objectives? 
D    If it will not, has this been clearly outlined to the supported combatant commander? 
D   Is the COA consistent with the law of armed conflict? 
D   Are command relationships clear, unambiguous, and understood by all parties? 
D   Between supporting and supported commanders? 
D    For command and control (C2) for SOF? 
D    For C2 of CA and PSYOP forces? 
D   Before operations commence, has the theater J-2 established a joint intelligence 
center (JIC)? Has the JTF J-2 established a joint intelligence support element (JISE)? 
D    Has a joint search and rescue center been designated or established? 
D   Has the CJTF elected to designate functional component commanders (e.g., joint 
force air component commander [JFACC], joint force land component commander, joint 
force maritime component commander, joint force special operations component 
commander)? 
D   Have the authority and responsibilities for functional component commanders been 
established by CJTF? 
D   Have the functional component commands' staffs been organized so that component 
representation reflects the composition of the joint force? 
D   Are commanders of the other JTF components aware of the functional component 
commanders' assigned authority and responsibilities? 
D   Have liaison officers from the other JTF components been assigned to the functional 
component commanders to facilitate coordinated joint force operations? 
D    Has an airspace control authority been assigned? (Normally assigned as a JFACC 
responsibility, if designated.) Is required liaison provided? 
D    Has an area air defense commander been assigned? (Normally assigned as a JFACC 
responsibility, if designated.) Is required liaison provided? 
D    What is the status of communications? 
D   Have multiple means of communications been provided for? 
D   Is there frequency deconfliction? 
D   Are the joint communications-electronics operation instructions adequate? 
D   Is there a requirement for joint airborne communications assets? 
D   Have common communications security materials (authenticators, operations codes, 
and key lists) been identified for all circuits, networks, and users? 
D    Are there any other special command, control, communications, and computers 
requirements to include Global Command and Control System capability for JTF 
components? 
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D    What country clearances are required for overflight, landing, or staging? What are 
the existing (or needed) agreements for overflight; staging; transit and refueling for 
combat, cargo, and evacuation aircraft; and basing rights? 
D   What forces and concept of operations are available if the adversary escalates 
abruptly? 
D   Has sufficient coordination with allies been conducted? 
D   What constraints have been placed on USTRANSCOM's components (e.g., 
allocation of lift assets)? 
D   What is the status of space system support coordination? 
D    If a theater missile threat exists, has a special request for tactical warning support 
been made to USSPACECOM's J-3 (in accordance with the Joint Service Tactical 
Exploitation of National Systems Manual)? Additionally, has USSPACECOM been 
requested to provide support from the Tactical Event Reporting System (TERS), to 
include equipment required to receive TERS downlink data (e.g., constant source and 
joint tactical terminal)? 
D   Has military satellite communications (MILS ATCOM) support been coordinated 
with the Defense Information System Agency MILS ATCOM Systems Office? 
D   Has Defense Satellite Communications System Ground Mobile Facility support been 
coordinated with the appropriate regional space support center? 
D    Has USSPACECOM been requested to provide a Joint Space Support Team to 
support the JTF and to serve as a focal point for the coordination of space systems 
support? 
D   Has the enemy situation changed appreciably; if so, what are the effects on the 
selected COAs? 
D    Have all necessary actions been taken to provide for self-defense of JTF forces? 
D   Will the predicted environmental conditions adversely affect the operation? Who 
will provide environmental updates to decision makers? 
D   Is logistics and administrative planning adequate? 
D   Has the OPORD been published? 
D    Do the component commanders' plans adequately address the coordinated 
employment, direction, and control of their forces in conformity with the JTF concept of 
operation? 
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Appendix F: Knowledge Map Index 
A-0: CAP Phases III-V 
A-l: Detailed CAP Phases III-V 
A-1.1: Phase III CO A Development 
A-1.1.1: CO A Development 
A-1.1.1.1: Concept of Operations 
A-1.1.1.2: TPFDD Development 
A-l.1.2: JCSCOAReview 
A-1.1.3: NCSCOA Review 
A-l.2: Phase IV COA Selection 
A-1.2.1: Planning Order Published 
A-l.2.2: Alert Order Approval 
A-l.2.3: Alert Order Published 
A-l .3: Phase V Execution Planning 
A-1.3.1: Execution Planning 
A-l.3.2: COA Converted into OPORD 
A-1.3.3: OPORD Approval 
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Activity: Actions transforming inputs into 
outputs 
Input: The items transformed into outputs by 
the activities 
Output:  Product generated by the activity from 
the inputs 
Control: Rules or guidlines defining how inputs 
are transformed into outputs 
Mechanism: The person, equipment, or 
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